The stock market of China experienced an abrupt crash in 2015 and evaporated over one third of the market value. Given its associations with fear and fine-resolutions in frequency, the illiquidity of stocks may offer a promising perspective of understanding and even signaling the market crash. In this study, by connecting stocks that mutually explain illiquidity fluctuations, a illiquidity network is established to model the market. It is found that as compared to non-crash days, the market is more densely connected on crash days due to heavier but more homogeneous illiquidity dependencies that facilitate abrupt collapses. Critical socks in the illiquidity network, in particular the ones in sector of finance are targeted for inspection because of their crucial roles in taking over and passing on the losing of illiquidity. The cascading failures of stocks in market crash is profiled as disseminating from small degrees to high degrees that usually locate in the core of the illiquidity network and then back to the periphery. And by counting the days with random failures in previous five days, an early single is implemented to successfully warn more than half crash days, especially those consecutive ones at early phase. Our results would help market practitioners like regulators detect and prevent risk of crash in advance.
Introduction
The stock market occupies the most profound role in the financial systems of modern economies like China. An abrupt stock market crash, like the one of 2015 that evaporated around 15 trillion yuan in wealth, therefore could be a cartographic shock to the economics and bring about huge losses to the whole society. In fact, how to understand the market crash and implement early warnings has been an important issue and trending topic not only in finance but also interdisciplinary fields after the crisis. While it is conventionally thought that market crash might be a typical black-swan event, which is hardly predicted due to sophisticated factors beyond and unexpected entanglements with external systems. Nevertheless, the associations between investor behaviors, like expectations, emotions and imitations and the market performance, especially their power in return predictions [1, 2] , imply that trading behaviors may provide a new but promising perspective of probing and warning the market crash.
In particular, details of every trading decision in high-frequency records further offer a manner of big-data proxy to investigate the collective behavior of investors, either before, during or after the market crash.
Liquidity, referring to the spread between bid price and ask price, inherently reflects expectations of investors towards the future performance of stocks in their elementary trading decisions. And illiquidity, which inversely originates from the pessimism of investors, would thus increase the crash risk since it dissolves the effective price information and disseminates panic across the market.
Given the significant impact from investor emotions, especially the negative ones [3, 4] , illiquidity can also be contagious, e.g., scared investors on stocks of illiquidity incline to sell out other stocks on hands to keep their own liquidity and reluctantly result in more stocks of illiquidity. Hence, in order to model the market crash from a system view, it would be natural to connect stocks of similar illiquidity fluctuations and build a network to represent the market. In the accordingly established illiquidity network, links among stocks stands for the possibilities of cascading crash across the market, suggesting a new angle of profiling the market crash dynamics. Though it is indeed not a new idea to transform a market into a network, linking stocks in terms of illiquidity is rarely visited. More importantly, different from previous networking models of mutual fund sharing [5] or price co-movements, illiquidity can be captured dynamically in a fine-resolution, i.e., in the most minimum decision granularity of bid and ask. It means that in terms of elementary decisions in trading and their contagions, the illiquidity network provides a very micro-perspective of the market crash.
Although there are lots of literatures on stock market crash, results on crash forecasts are still inadequate and more efforts are desperate. Unlike many emerging financial markets, however, the China stock market is unique since it is dominated by individual investors [6] . Contrary to their institutional counterparts, individual investors are more emotional and susceptible, meaning they are more likely to be scared, spread panic and overly react to external disturbs. They even imitate trading strategies and help forge the herding in market. These characteristics might undermine the challenges that make crash hard to predict and suggest the possibility of detecting the crash of China market at early days.
In terms of illiquidity, the trading behaviors in extreme market situations can be finely examined from the micro perspective, helping identify the sources of market volatility and extreme stock price movements. In addition, the anomaly in the evolution of illiquidity networks can also be probed from the differences between crash days to non-crash days, which paves the way to develop the warning signals of market crash.
Inspired by above motivations, this study aims to profile, explain and warn the China market crash through the illiquidity network. The illiquidity of stocks is defined and derived from 2.3 billion trades in 2015, from which profound associations between illiquidity and negative emotions of investors like fear are disclosed. The illiquidity dependency between stocks, measured by the mutual information, can surprisingly distinguish crash days from those non-crash ones.
And it is also inspiring that the market is more connected and homogeneous due to heavier and lower-deviated illiquidity dependencies on crash days. While in the illiquidity network, influential stocks in crash are found to be the ones with large capital values or belonging to the sector of finance. The dynamics of the crash is also profiled in the illiquidity network as cascading failures of losing illiquidity from stocks of smaller degrees to the ones of higher degrees that usually locate in the core and then out to the fringe. More importantly, an early signal, which simply counts the days without systemic failures in a window of previous five days is presented to accurately warn more than half crash days in 2015. Our results decently demonstrate the power of illiquidity network in understanding market crash of China and would help practitioners in particularly the regulators inspect risky stocks and prevent possible crash in advance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literatures. Section 3 introduces our datasets and the methodology of measuring illiquidity. Section 4 presents the results from illiquidity networks. Section 5 concludes the paper with a brief summary and suggestions for future research.
Literature review
Due to the late development of China's stock market and the obvious gap with developed foreign markets, there have been some unique features of the Chinese stock market discussed among the academic scholars and practitioners.
On the one hand, Yao et al. indicated that Chinese investors exhibit different levels of herding behavior [7] . On the other hand, Xing and Yang found that the increased correlation among the stocks could ignite market crash [8] . Further, Tian et al. found that institutional investors (primarily pension funds) provide stabilizing effect during extreme market-down days [9] , unlike Dennis and Strickland who revealed that institutional investors magnify extreme market movements by buying (selling) more on return-up (return-down) days in the U.S. markets [10] . Although there are many related studies in either China market or foreign ones, no detailed explanations and early warning signals of stock market crash have been given to prevent risks. In the meantime, the dominant occupation of individual investors in China market also implies the possible abnormality in trading behaviors that can be sensed and detected as warnings before the crash.
In fact, previous efforts have already suggested that the stock market crash is closely related to illiquidity. Amihud et al. presented evidence linking the decline in stock prices to increased illiquidity using the method of bid-ask spread during the market crash [11] . As return is more comparable to price, related research on associations between return and illiquidity has increased rapidly.
Amihud and Bekaert et al. stated that there is a positive correlation between stock returns and illiquidity in terms of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar volume and the proportion of zero return days, respectively [12, 13] . Furthermore, Nagel indicated that the main reason of the evaporation of liquidity during crash is the increasing expected returns of liquidity [14] . Even more inspiring, measuring illiquidity, e.g., through bid-ask spread, is deeply rooted in the minimum decision granularity of daily trading and thus can be inherently derived from highly frequent trading records of investors. And also, illiquidity contains future economic information which can be employed for stock market forecasting [15, 16] . Therefore, it is feasible to explore stock market crash from the perspective of illiquidity, but existing examinations still lack explanations, cascading dynamics, and warning signals of the crash.
Illiquidity may also be influenced by both internal and external factors including stock attributes, policies and industry, which should be considered in understanding the market crash. Stoll et al. suggested that stock attributes such as market value, volume and volatility can significantly reshape the stock illiquidity [15, 16, 17] . On the other hand, An et al. found that macro economic factors such as media independence, policy uncertainty, default risk and funding conditions have a remarkable impact on illiquidity [18, 19, 20, 21] . These evidences imply that stocks can be well profiled in terms of illiquidity and more importantly, external shocks to the market can also be absorbed and thus sensed through illiquidity. In addition, the illiquidity of individual stocks co-varies with each other [22, 23, 24, 25, 26] , suggesting in essence that illiquidity can be con-tagious across the market.
Modeling market as a network of stocks to examine the crash is a new and promising approach in recent efforts. Stocks can be connected due to price correlations or common investors [5] . By removing failed stocks, e.g., reaching the down-limit and transactions being suspended, the market crash can then be reflected through the falling apart of the network. The topology evolution before and after the 2008 financial crisis of South African, Korean and Chinas stock markets were investigated [27, 28, 29] , respectively, in which the minimum spanning trees (MST) are carefully examined. Li and Pi proposed a complex network based method to understand the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis on global main stock index [30] . besides, Bosma et al. use network centrality to identify the position of the financial industry in the network, which can be a significant predictors of bailouts [31] . In particular, the turbulence in 20152016 were probed by transforming China stock market into a complex network, showing that there exist influential stocks and sectors within the market crash [5, 32] . Nevertheless, connecting stocks because of illiquidity associations is rarely considered in constructing the market network. The absence of establishing illiquidity networks in existing studies on market crash will spark up new perspectives in this paper.
To sum up, although extensive efforts have been devoted on the association between stock illiquidity and market crash, few insights are available on illiquidity networks based on high-frequency transaction data. Given the closeness between stock illiquidity and both internal and external factors of the market, probing the crash from the perspective of illiquidity networks could offer more insightful observations and explanations. Moreover, the dominance of individual investors in China stock market also indicates that the trading abnormality, which can be grasped by illiquidity and its contagion in a fine resolution could produce novel signals to warn risks before the crash. From a interdisciplinary view, a big-data proxy based on tremendous trading records before, during and after the 2015 crash of Chinas stock market will be employed to measure illiquidity, establish networks, examine crash dynamics and detect warning signals.
Dataset and methods

Dataset
The data sample employed in this study consists of stocks selected from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2015, i.e., more than 2500 stocks and a total of 244 trading days. In particular, transaction records of the minimum trading decision granularity include ask price, ask volume, bid price, and bid volume for every second of every stock. The dataset is provided by the Wind Information (Wind Info), a leading integrated service provider of financial data in China. Then, for identifying the stock market crash, the crash days are defined as days whose number of stocks being sell-off to the down limit (the allowed maximum one-day drop of a stock, i.e., ten percent of its closing price last day) is more than 800 . Specifically, as seen in Figure 1 , in 2015, there are 17 trading days on which the stock market was crashed, including June 19th, June 26th, June 29th, July 1st, July 2nd, July 3rd, July 6th, July 7th, July 8th, July 15th, July 27th, Aug.18th, Aug.24th, Aug.25th, Sept.1st, Sept.14th, Oct.21st. And other days before or after these crash ones will be defined as non-crash days and consist the counterparts for further comparison.
Measuring illiquidity
The transaction data is full of noise due to the too much frequent occurrences of quote. In order to filter out noise and smooth the data, a fixed time window of one minute is selected to average the spread. Note that as compared to previous study, one minute is short enough to reflect the investment behavior of investors at the smallest decision granularity. Besides, it is necessary to convert the length of data sequence into 237 minutes for every stock in a day for the reason that the Shenzhen Stock Exchange adopts collective bid for the last three minutes. With respect to the illiquidity, various methods have been presented to calculate it for different occasions and purposes. The methods on low-frequency data work great when high-frequency data is not available [12, 33, 34, 35, 36] , but it is still undeniable that approaches based on high-frequency data perform better since richer information and higher accuracy [19, 37] . Here the illiquidity is expected to sense the minimum decisions in trading behavior, hence the bid-ask spread based on high-frequency records, which is always considered to be the best method, is selected to measure illiquidity [38, 39] . Moreover, it is known that the size of the transaction has a great impact on illiquidity, we further update the measure by adding the quoted amount as the weight of the spread.
The illiquidity can be noted as
where A it is the ask price of investor i at time t, V it is the ask volume of investor i at time t, B jt is the bid price of investor j at time t, V jt is the ask volume of investor j at time t, P mid,t is the mean of ask price and bid price at time t. It can be learned from the definition that the lower the weighted spread, the lower the transaction coast and the lower the illiquidity.
The potential capability of the illiquidity in understanding the market crash can be simply illustrated in Figure 2 , in which the market index is negatively 
Results
Illiquidity and crash
It is supposed that trading behaviors, especially the elementary actions like ask and bid of high frequency, would be essentially influenced by shocks like market crash. As can be seen in Figure 3 (a), when stocks approached down limit on crash days, the volume of bid experienced an abrupt decline and then vanished, contrarily the ask volume soared, implying that many investors were forced to sell off shares owing to panic selling and risk prevention. However, approaching down limit might also happen on non-crash days. To further testify the impact from market crash on trading behaviors, we randomly select ten crash days and non-crash days to compose two different groups and compare the occurrence occupations of no-ask, no-bid, and no-quote when stocks experienced down limit. It is unexpected that crash days can be surprisingly distinguished from non-crash days. Specifically, as can be seen in Figure 3 This logarithmic-like relationship also indicates that the longer the no-bid lasts, the more anxious the investors are and the soar of ask eventually slows down.
The saturation of ask volume can be explained that investors will become less panic when more information is obtained. From this perspective, trading actions like ask can be directly connected to investor emotions and intuitively, illiquidity The stock is randomly selected from the sample, and other stocks have similar relationships.
(b) shows the correlation between investors' fear and the illiquidity, whose value is 0.44 with p-value 0.00.
the negative ones.
In order to empirically verify the possible associations between illiquidity and investor emotions, the correlations between illiquidity and investor emotions sensed in social media are examined. Specifically, daily emotions towards Chinas stock market delivered by investors in social media are split into fear, sadness, disgust, joy and anger [1] . The averaged sequence of illiquidity of the market is accordingly aggregated into a daily sequence and its significant associations with fear can be found in Figure 4b . The cointegration regression also proves the accuracy since the coefficient of determination is greater than 0.7.
The found positive correlation implies that the illiquidity can well reflect, even in a better resolution, the fear in Chinas stock market, in which individual investors dominate. In fact, it is difficult for individual investors to be completely rational, they usually like to follow suit blindly and catch up and sell down, causing disorder fluctuations and then spread negative emotions like fear across market. Individual investors may follow and imitate institutional investors for believing that institutional investors possessing more capacity to collect and process information owing to the professional knowledge. The key, however, is that many institutional investors are not rational as assumed, and they are also susceptible to external shocks when dealing with information and making decisions. Besides, even for financial professionals, fear, a potential mechanism underlying risk aversion, might make investors divest more stocks [40] . Then fear from those institutional investors might be magnified by following individual investors and reignite much stronger disturb that would lead to a market crash. Hence from the perspective of negative emotions and their contagions, the illiquidity can be contagious among stocks, suggesting that establishing a network by connecting stocks due to mutual illiquidity dependency could offer a new proxy of emotion contagion to finely probe the dynamics of crash.
Illiquidity networks and crash
In the stock market of China, the actual interactions coupled within stocks are extraordinarily important because of susceptible investors. While most ex-isting models forge links between stocks mainly based on the similarity of timeseries, e.g., of price and measures of Pearson and Partial correlations are extensively employed [41, 42, 43, 44] . However, the relationship between stocks is too complicated and should not be too much simplified to neglect trading behaviors, investor emotions and their possible contagions. Taking the limitations of linear correlations into account, here we use mutual information to measure the nonlinear dependency between illiquidity of stock pairs. In fact ,the power in reflecting nonlinear dependency of mutual information in networking market have been previously demonstrated and emphasized [32, 45, 46] . By calculating the normalized mutual information (NMI) of illiquidity series in minute between all pairs of stocks, we first try to profile the distributions of illiquidity dependency of the market on both crash and non-crash days. As can be found in randomly selected samples in Figure 5 (a), the globally averaged NMI is getting larger while the standard deviation (e.g., the broadness of the distribution) is getting smaller when the stock market is approaching a turmoil. Drawing a mean-standard deviation graph with all the transaction days over the year of 2015 for ease of observation, see as Figure 5 (b), it is clear that the average mutual information will increase and the standard deviation will decrease while in the crash days, indicating that the illiquidity network will become more closely connected and more homogeneously coupled when the market is in a bad situation. Because of pessimism, investors become cautious and unwilling to participate in the transaction, which abruptly increases and spreads illiquidity across the market and results in a crash. Besides, we also find that the market crash demonstrates a lasting effect because the days after the crash show the same characteristics as the day in the crash. However, regarding to the days before the crash, as seen in Figure 5 (b), they overlap with those of non-crash and hardly demonstrate any distinct features, suggesting that from the global and static view there is no warning signal can be detected. It inspires us to investigate the illiquidity network from more in-depth and dynamic perspectives further.
In building an illiquidity network, links are weighted as NMI between their ends illiquidity, while not all links are necessarily kept and those with less weights, which might relatively represent random dependency among stocks instead of plausible paths for illiquidity contagion, would be removed. Specifically, the size of the giant connected component (GCC) is taken into account for locating the critical threshold of link weight [47, 5] , i.e., the value beyond which the size of GCC starts to decline rapidly will be set as the threshold for each trading day (see Appendix Figure A1 (a)). And links with weights below the threshold will then be omitted since their removals trivially influence the connectivity of the market structure. The ratio of GCC in illiquidity networks fluctuates and significantly increase on crash days, suggesting consistently that the market will be more connected and coupled in crashes (see Appendix Figure   A1 The illiquidity network of stock market evolves in forms of adding new links or removing existing connections. It is found that the Chinas stock market evolves in a high frequency, especially on crash days and only 10% links kept on average for consecutive two trading days (see Appendix Figure A2 ). Highly varying structures suggest that to target critical stocks that function profoundly in crash can help inspect market risk. In terms of grouping stocks into different sections or capital styles (see Appendix Table A1 ), a degree-weighted proportion, denoted as R ij , is defined to identify key group i of stocks on trading day j. Specifically,
where n ij is the occurrence of stocks belonging to group (sector or style) i and it is summed over all links in the network of j day, n j is the occurrence of all stocks and it is summed over all links in the network of j day, N ij is the number of group i in the network of j day, N j is the number of unique stocks in the network of j day. Accordingly, the group of stocks with higher R ij will occupy more links in the market, meaning heavier dependency on other stocks illiquidity and greater odds of taking over or passing on crash risk. It is unexpected that, as can be seen Figure 6(a) , the sector of finance constantly occupies the highest proportion in Chinas stock market, especially on crash days. As for the capital style, the style of large capitalization, i.e., the large-cap-value is the most critical group in market crash (see Figure 6 (b)). Both observations suggest that stocks in finance, especially those of large capital values, should be targets of inspection for market regulators.
The falling-apart of Chinas market in crash was consisted by waves of stocks completely losing illiquidity, i.e., declining to the down limit [48] . These failure waves produced peaks in number of newly failed stocks (see Appendix Figure   A3 ). Assuming that each wave of failure can be identified by a peak, then stocks that failed before the peak could be seeding failures that lead to the corresponding wave of losing illiquidity. Then sectors with more stocks failed before peaks might be causes of the following collapse and thus could be targets Sij information technology Figure 7 : The significance of failing before peak. The red dots indicate crash days, and the blue dots indicate non-crash days. S ij = R bp ji −R bpr ji , so S ij may be positive or negative. If S ij is positive, which means stocks within i tend to fail before peaks. It is obvious that the sector of finance failed most before peaks on crash days. In contrast, the sectors like manufacturing and information technology perform similarly both on crash and non-crash days. Note that S ij can not be calculated for all stocks since some of them might not appear in the illiquidity network due to good liquidity, especially on non-crash days.
for early inspection and even sources of warning signals. A new ratio, denoted as R bp ij is thus defined to target critical sectors, which can be calculated as
where n bp ij is the number of stocks failed before peaks in group i on day j, N bp j is the number of stocks failed before peaks on day j. To testify the significance of failing before peaks, the timings of fail for all the stocks of one trading day are also randomly shuffled to get a random value of R bp ij , which is denoted as R bpr ij for comparison to test significance. Then for group i, its significance of being seeds that probably lead to a wave of failures on day j can be defined simply as S ij = R bp ij − R bpr ij . Intuitively, S ij will be much greater than 0 if stocks within i tend to fail before peaks. Consistent with our above observation, the sector of finance, as can be seen in Figure 7 , failed most before peaks, especially on crash days. In the contrary, the significance of sectors like manufacturing and information technology just fluctuates around zero with trivial deviations.
It again suggests that stocks of finance in Chinas market might be sinks or even triggers that produce illiquidity and spread it across the market. In terms of inspecting these stocks of finance, market practitioners, in particular the regulators, could sense warnings from their abnormal variations on illiquidity.
The illiquidity network can also track the dynamics of market crash. Considering peaks of newly failed stocks can be interfaces to split failure cascades, the timing distance between the timing of losing illiquidity to the peak timing inherently measures at which stage the stock join the crash cascade. Specifically, for negative distances, smaller ones stand for the early collapse, while for positive distances, greater ones represent the later failures in the crash (see Figure 8 (a)). We then examine the function between stock degree and the absolute value of time distance, as can be seen in Figure 8(b) , it is found that the degree, in particular the maximum degree in each bin, is negatively correlated with the distance. This negative association indicates that stocks fails nearly the peak timing are those with high degrees, while these fail at the early state or at the ending of the crash possess small degrees. Thats to say, the crash (a) Figure 8 : The correlation between stock degree and the timing distance of losing illiquidity to the peak. (a) shows the degrees of stocks that decline to the down limit before and after the peak. How to find and determine the peak of stocks decline to the down limit is illustrated in Appendix Figure A3 . (b) shows that greater the absolute distance, smaller the degrees of stocks (y-axis is logarithmic). The correlation between the maximum degree and the absolute distance is -0.66 with p-value 0.00.
ignites from stocks of small degrees, then spread to stocks of high degrees which usually locate at the core of the network and finally cascades to the periphery.
Though market crash in essence originates from failure of these crucial nodes in the core, those with small degrees collapsed at the early stage might be the real triggers. Consisting with the previous study [48] , this finding discloses the unexpected role of small-degree stocks in market crash and inspire regulators pay more attention on those conventionally might be overlooked, especially the ones in finance sector.
Illiquidity networks and a warning signal
Above illustrations solidly suggest the associations between illiquidity network and market crash. Assuming market crash being systemic failure rather than random error, stocks failed together in a short interval, e.g., ten minutes, should be inherently entangled with each other due the contagion of losing illiquidity and therefore connected in our built illiquidity network. Then the non-randomness of failures within a short interval i can be defined as
n f (n f −1)/2 , where n f stocks got to the down limit in i simultaneously, e n f is the number of links among them that captured in the illiquidity network built on the corresponding day and n f (n f − 1)/2 is the maximum number of possible links among them. In line with this, higher w i represents more likelihoods of systemic failures instead of random errors, i.e., signs of crash. And wd j = <w i > from all intervals of trading day j can be accordingly measured to value the daily non-randomness. As can be seen in Appendix Figure A4(a) , most values of the daily non-randomness are zero and greater fluctuations significantly occur as approaching crash days, which implies a warning signal could be accordingly forged.
Given the fluctuations of daily non-randomness (see Appendix Figure A4 (a)), a sliding window of t days, meaning historical information of previous t days is supposed to be helpful, is set to smooth the daily sequence and then we simply count the occurrences of w d = 0 within the window, which is denoted as N w d =0 to construct a warning signal. Specifically, smaller N w d =0 suggests more sys- temic failures and greater odds of leading to market crash. As can be seen in Appendix Figure S4 (b), as t = 5, an abrupt decline of N w d =0 can be detected one day earlier than more than half of 2015 crash days in China's stock market, in particular for those consecutive ones occurred at the early phase. It indicates that if N w d =0 = 0 in the previous five days, a warning signal should be sent out because there would be a market crash in the next day, as seen in Figure 9 .
Note that t = 5 is the optimal setting as we vary t from 1 to 15 days. It is interesting that time windows with length shorter than five days result in insensitive N w d =0 , while those of longer than five days result in disappearance of signals in advance. The one day ahead of the crash is vital because it indicates that the presented early warning signal can help prevent systematic risk of the market in reality. It should also be noted that not all the crashes of 2015 can be effectively and correctly warned (see Figure 9 and Appendix Figure A4(b) ) and those on which the signal failed might be caused by shocks that similar to random ones on non-crash days. Besides, former crash might essentially re-structured the stock market and make the later crash hard to predict. been an open and trending problem in not only finance but also interdiscipline.
Conclusions
In fact, from the view of system science, the stock market can be modeled as a complex network and the crash can thus be cascading failures of stocks that decline to the down limit. Nevertheless, in previous study, trading behaviors, in particular the emotions of investors are rarely considered in networking the market, which in essence motivates the present study.
Given the dominance of individual investors in China's stock market, it is assumed that abnormal decisions and negative emotions could help profile and even warn the market crash. Illiquidity, which is defined as weighted spread between ask price and bid price, can capture trading decisions of ask and bid in a fine resolution of minute and is significantly associated with fear of investors, suggesting a novel perspective of modeling the market and crash. By connecting stocks with illiquidity mutually associated, it is found that the market is more densely and homogeneously coupled due to great mean and low deviation of illiquidity dependencies, which can explain the abrupt collapse of the market in the crash. Stocks are not randomly connected and the ones with large capital value or from the sector of finance are targeted as most influential parts in the market crash. What is even more interesting is that the negative correlation between maximum degrees and distances to the peak of down limit suggests the pattern of periphery-core-periphery propagations in crash. And by simply counting the days without systemic failures in previous five days, an early signal is also derived from the illiquidity network to warn in advance more than half crash days in 2015. Our results could help market practitioners like regulators inspect risky stocks like the ones from finance sector or with small degrees and sense the early warning signal to prevent the crash. Our approach can also be easily adjusted and extended to stock markets of other countries.
While we must admit that not all the crash can be warned accurately by the proposed early signal (N w d =0 = 0). Those crashes that our signal failed to warn imply that the causes beyond crash can be sophisticated and some of them might be truly caused by random shocks. How to group crashes into categories of can be warned or not will be an interesting direction in the future work. In the meantime, the possible entanglement between different crashes also deserves more efforts. The value beyond which the size of GCC starts to decline rapidly will be set as the threshold for each trading day, it is found that the value can be well captured when the decline of size is more than 1%. Considering that the size of the second largest connected component is small, the GCC can well represent the entire network. (b) shows that the threshold fluctuates with time, but increases greatly during the crash days (the red dots indicate crash days), suggesting consistently that the market will be more connected and coupled in crash. number of failed stocks Figure A3 : The peaks of stocks down to limit. The principle of determining the peak is that the number of stocks mentioned above is the largest relative to the previous period and the subsequent period. As can be seen, there may be multiple peaks within a day. (b) shows the occurrence of w d = 0, i.e., the daily non-randomness is zero within five days, which is denoted as N w d =0 to construct a warning signal. Specifically, smaller N w d =0 suggests more systemic failures and greater odds of leading to market crash. As can be seen, an abrupt decline of N w d =0 can be detected one day earlier. It indicates that if N w d =0 = 0 in the previous five days, a warning signal can be implemented to warn a market crash in the next day.
